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 Of course not, for I am no democrat and the purpose of this paper is to persuade 
you not to be one either. 
 
Why Democracy? 
 
 Let me begin by listing some standard objections to democratic phenomena. 
Democratic societies are invariably dominated by entrenched bureaucratic elites. This is 
the case throughout Europe, in America and in Japan. The institutionalization of the 
democratic process is virtually synonymous with the process of the bureaucratization of 
society. Bureaucratized societies are inevitably dominated by an elite which monopolizes 
all types of power – cultural, economic, political. Elections become merely a means for a 
circulation of segments within this elite. Is it any wonder that political participation – 
measured, for example, by election turn out rates – has continued to decline (with rare 
exceptions) throughout Europe and America for the last fifty years? 
 
 The disillusionment with democratic system is fully understandable only if we are 
prepared to ask some fairly basic questions. The first of these is: why do people in 
capitalist societies desire the rich life. The second (even more basic) question is: ought 
we to desire this kind of life? In the rest of this paper I’ll try and answer these questions 
rather informally. 
 
 
 In answering the first question I’ll describe the capitalist way of life. In answering 
the second I’ll try to show you why we should revolt against the capitalist way of life and 
opt for a life of love. 
 
A rich life 
 
 Perhaps it’s best to begin with John Stuart Mill – liberalism’s most enduring 
theorist. Mill was a utilitarian; he believed that the purpose of all action is the 
maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain (as conceived in mainstream 
psychology). But unlike his teacher Jeremy Bentham, Mill also had a respect for rights. 
 
 Now liberalism recognizes two kinds of rights; individual or human rights 
(property, life, belief) and welfare rights (equality of opportunity, provision of basic 
necessities). Mill believed that unless the rules that guaranteed the existence of these 
rights were rigorously observed, utility maximization was impossible. 
 
 Why? Because (according to Mill) unless these rules were observed conflicts 
between individual and total utility maximization could not be resolved. Thus if I steal I 
increase my utility. But if everyone steals and there are no sanctions against theft, the 
capitalist property system will collapse and total utility will fall. It is therefore necessary 
that individual rights be protected in the interest of the long run maximization of total 
social utility. Similarly, welfare rights also need to be respected according to Mill who 
did not believe in any operation of the invisible hand. The interest of the weaker section 
of society had to be protected if their allegiance to capitalism was to be retained. The 
formal theory about all this has been developed by John Rawls in the context of his so-
called “Difference Principle”. Welfare rights are a means for showing everyone including 
the least privileged that the capitalist life is richer than any other life. 
 
 So respect for rights is a means for the respect of the point of view of the whole. 
This is merely acceptance of the view that the ought to be maximized is total (not 
individual) utility. Mill realized that only members of the elite could fully subscribe to 
this view – he was therefore in favor of limiting the franchise. 
 
 Mill and other nineteenth century liberals – Bosenquet, Hobhouse, T.H. Green – 
recognized the need for the emergence of a particular type of character if the rich life was 
to be realized. This conception was fundamentally flawed in that it sought to combine 
two divergent tendencies. 
 
 The person taking the point of view of the whole is participative, rational and 
deliberative in his public life. But in his inner or private life he is assumed to be 
impulsive and capricious. He acquires his ends voluntaristically not through a process of 
cognition. His self is a vast nothingness which can possess ends but cannot be constituted 
by them. Such a self seeks not knowledge of itself but knowledge only of the world – the 
possibility of self knowledge is ruled out axiomatically. 
 
 Knowledge of the world is sought solely for the gratification of desires of such a 
self (lets call him J). Moreover, since liberalism provides no basis for evaluation of these 
desires, private morality is impossible. J’s worth as a person is not determined by the 
quality of his feelings or the nature of his emotional life. 
 
 This has very important implications. As a liberal, J is a self interested self who 
wills what he wills voluntarily and is incapable of evaluating the quality of his feelings. J 
is an isolated self. He recognizes R but only as another isolated self interested self equally 
incapable of evaluating the quality of her feelings. Hewn recognizes her as one such self J 
demonstrates his inability to love R – to bridge the gap that fractures his being. 
 
 For being is not J and R. Being is J-R. J and R are two persons but one being, J-R. 
Their relationship is that of union not of possession or contract. But democracy denies 
this. It denies the possibility of love. Democracy regards J and R as equal and isolated 
individuals whose only possible relationship can be that of contract – a contract through 
which they use each other for the achievement of shared ends. Democracy provides the 
political framework through which such equal and isolated individuals realize shared 
ends. It provides a framework for the recognition of all ends as equally legitimate and for 
the structuring of unavoidable clashes of irreconcilable interests. 
 
 Since there are no bases in liberal democratic societies for evaluating desires – the 
desires of a saint and an atheist, of a mother and a homesexual are treated as of equal 
worth – the only ground for the ultimate reconciliation of conflicting interests is that of 
accumulation. Democracy facilitates an expansion of means – income, wealth, power, 
authority for the satisfaction of any desires. The liberal ‘community’ is held together by 
its unqualified commitment to the priority it accords to the accumulation of means. The 
liberal ‘community’s’ commitment to both democracy is conditional on the ability of 
democratic organizational forms to facilitate accumulation. 
 
 The over-riding democratic ideal is freedom – the ability of the isolated 
unreflective self to will and possess any end. The quest for freedom is a quest for 
postponing indefinitely the realization of ends in favor of an endless accumulation of 
means. The quest for freedom is never ending for accumulation takes the form of capital, 
itself an infinite abstraction. The point of view of the whole is merely the point of view 
which accords unrelenting primacy to the accumulation of capital. 
 
 Only the elite – an ever diminishing breed – unreservedly commits itself to this 
point of view. Only members of this elite are truly isolated, really free. Only they are true 
embodiments of the subjectivity of freedom, capable of appreciating the spirit and culture 
of the modern world – its art, its music, its architecture. Only they recognize the 
implications of according priority to accumulation and are prepared to pay the terrible 
price that a rich life extracts. 
 
 The masses on the other hand do not share this commitment. The masses are not 
free. They are controlled and manipulated victims of both retributive and distributive 
injustices, imperfectly indoctrinated into accepting the morality of lust and greed. From 
time to time the  
masses ‘go wild’, protest against the regimentation and monotony of democratic society 
where  
the political framework is never itself in question and where the policies of ostensibly 
rival parties become increasingly indistinguishable. In the absence of a revolutionary 
leadership explicitly rejecting the morality of freedom and espousing the morality of love 
such revolts are easily deflected by the articulation of a strategy of co-option of trade 
unions, ethnic movements etc. The masses are taught the lesson that the gilded chains of 
freedom can never be discarded. 
 
 The terrible moral degradation that accompanies democratization had been 
foreseen by Plato and Aristotle. Thus Plato in his famous Republic rejects the democratic 
order because in his view it promotes lust and ambitiousness, leads to an unequal 
distribution of wealth and power and corrupts both the public and the elite. Aristotle 
argued (in both Politics and Ethics) that democracy has no telos (no overall aim). This is 
democracy stood on its head. For the elite which dominates democracy has the telos of 
nothingness – it seeks ever expanding nothingness, freedom, in which the isolated 
individual can will and possess any end, all ends being equally worthless. 
 
 Rousseau sought to avoid this terrible catastrophe by inventing the fiction of the 
social contract. By ruling collectively, continuously and absolutely the people create a 
socially redemptive secular order and thus overcome the moral depravity characteristic of 
liberal democracy. Not Athens but Sparta was Rousseau’s ideal. But the miraculous 
transformation in character is not firmly rooted in a metaphysical system which can 
specify the nature of the redemption that is supposed to occur socially. Rousseau and 
Voltaire destroyed Christian belief in France but the demons whose worship they 
advocated – the individual, the nation – are capable only of leading man to hell. 
 
 Social redemption is pure fiction and the communitarian democracies which have 
sought its realization have inevitably collapsed. Communitarian democracies have 
historically taken two forms; nationalism or socialism. In both the individual is induced 
to collapse his being in a human totality – the nation or the class. But this human totality 
pursues the same ultimate goal, the goal of freedom, that liberalism sanctions. 
Communitarianism conceives of the totality as a super ego – an individual writ large – 
and is thus quite unable to provide a metaphysical basic for transcending the putrid 
morality of avarice (accumulation) and jealousy (competition) which liberalism 
sanctions. J-R is expected to eschew self interest so that society as a whole can practice 
this very same self orientation. Is it any wonder that mass and elite disillusionment with 
nationalism and socialism soon assumes universal proportions and a restoration of the old 
(liberal) regime becomes only a matter of time. The democratic order, whether individual 
or communitarian, can only institutionalize the morality of avarice (accumulation) and 
jealousy (competition) for its telos is nothingness – the demon it worships is Freedom. 
 
 Democratic structure facilitates a universalization of the worship of freedom. 
Thus universal franchise is a means for articulating the principle that every individual is 
equal in that his preferences are as legitimate as any other preferences. Representation 
permits an aggregation of these preferences on the one hand and on the other by 
facilitating the recognition of the principle of the inviolability of human rights (this is the 
basis of all constitutional regimes) it  
forecloses the possibility of assigning value to these preferences except in quantitative 
terms. The more J participate in this system, the more self centered he becomes for such 
participation makes it impossible for him to value preferences – his own or R’s. If J can’t 
value preferences he can’t love R – he cannot make her ends his own or realize the 
heaven that is pre-ordained being with R. As Heidegger said, forgetfulness of being is the 
defining characteristic of this age of vulgarity. 
 
 Democracy makes of us persons without being. We exist without essence, we 
have no qualities and no character. We are zombies and not men. There is J and R but no 
J-R. Since concerns about quality – value – disappears democratic societies are 
necessarily dominated by bureaucracies – both public and private. Michel’s saw this a 
hundred years ago. He showed both how and why democratic organizations are 
transformed into oligarchic bureaucracies dominated by a professional elite over which 
the masses have virtually no control. The rule of this bureaucratic oligarchy is legitimized 
on the basis of a social consensus which sanctions only the quest for increase (riba). Riba 
is pure quantity. The masses and the elite single mindedly seek to pursue the fastest 
possible rate of increase in pure quantity – there is no disagreement about this being the 
single, unchangeable social priority. (About everything else there is apathy or cynicism). 
Public communication and the education system stress social consensus and legitimize 
the rule of the bureaucratic oligarchy which demonstratably possesses the super 
rationality and the hyper ruthlessness to maximize welfare. Its rule is challenged – and 
even then only spasmodically – when it is seen to fail in this task. 
 
 As noted earlier, these challenges or revolts are easily contained since the 
challengers continue to espouse the telos of nothingness and the quest for increase in pure 
quantity continues to dominate their individual lives. 
 
 Democratic theory assumes that Javed is a person without being (without R). He 
has no Resalind (we read As you Like It, didn’t we). There is no ‘J is being with R’. 
Democratic practice makes Javed a solitary person. The real complex and changing 
individual is politically separated from his being – from R, from God. Personhood is 
improvised and by denying God, abandoning R, J destroys his being. He becomes 
acquisitive, lustful, jealous and self-centered. Abandoning R destroys creativity. The 
disintegration of the family and near-zero population growth are universal characteristics 
of democratic societies. Democratic societies are barren, impotent, dead societies in 
which men ‘with head pieces filled with straw’ seek only satisfaction of their lust. 
 
 Heaven, for J is pre ordained being with R; it is nothing else. R is God’s greatest 
gift to J – a gift bestowed on him not because of any thing he did or can do but as an act 
of pure divine grace. He is not now and can never be truly worthy of this gift – for R 
symbolizes unimaginable beauty and limitless love. She is the most precious, most 
cherished, element in J’s being. She is as pure as sacred, as holy as prayer. She is a 
different person but not a separate being. J-R is one being. J-R is prior to J and R. J is 
because J-R, united in submission to God and stewardship of the world. 
 
 
 Democracy denies the heaven that is pre-ordained being with R. It creates the 
illusion that J can create heaven on earth through accumulation. But a denial of the 
heaven that is pre-ordained being with R is a denial of all objectivity. The seeker after 
freedom – the object of democracy that is merely a vast nothingness – is necessarily a 
cynic who doubts the validity of all substantive laws and moral prescriptions – except 
those which are universaliable. Since no such laws can exist, Kant’s categorical 
imperative lacks all substantive content and is pure form. 
 
 A denial of all objective criteria for determining value and worth is ultimately a 
denial of being. It is a denial of the reality that is pre-ordained being with R in submission 
to God and in stewardship over the world. By denying this being in its twin 
manifestations – that of submission and that of stewardship – solitude is assumed, the 
solitude of the predator. In such a situation J can only appear, he cannot be – for he has 
lost R and this is an irreparable loss. Without R, J can neither worship God nor care for 
this world. Losing R is losing life itself for she is his heart and without the hearth there 
can be no life. 
 
 Abandoning R leads to being abandoned by God and immersion in a sea of 
delusions and whispers “(waswasa)”. In this world J can dream any dream he chooses – 
for every dream is equally unreal. He can will and possess any end without reference to 
reality. There exists no basis for judging appearances for by assuming solitude (Kant calls 
this authenticity) and abandoning R, J wills the non-existence of reality. The solitary 
apparition that is freedom seeking J must deny the reality that is J-R and the reality that is 
J Æ (A – Allah, W – World). 
 
 Abandoning R is denying the possibility of love and without love there can be no 
community. The quest for freedom is a total denial of the possibility of union. An 
expansion of the concept of citizenship or a reassertion of the sphere of civil society over 
the state – through reducing bureaucracy increasing participation etc. – can never take the 
place of a search for truth and for acceptance of this truth. By denying the possibility of 
truth (both as love and surrender) democracy fails to address the problem of being. It 
cannot help to answer the question; who am I? (J); What am I to become? 
 
 It provides grounds only for according permanent priority to accumulation of its 
own sake. The satisfaction of needs must be structured in accordance with the rationality 
based on this worship of nothingness. This never ending, senseless quest for more and 
more and more pure quantity, this deadly serious insanity, has been graphically depicted 
as “purposefulness without a purpose” by Kant. 
 
 Abandoning R and having been abandoned by God, J keeps on endlessly 
conquering this world, purposelessly expanding the space in which he can will and 
possess his arbitrarily willed ends – but the ends that can be willed within democracy 
become more and more constrained by capitalist rationality. J can will only that which is 
consistent with the overwhelming social priority that is accorded to accumulation for its 
own sake – the unrelenting quest for nothingness. That is why in democratic regimes 
administration rapidly takes the place of politics and choice is severely constrained. The 
seeker after nothingness is not free to choose. He is conditioned – through indoctrination, 
mass communication, public education, other socialization processed and above all 
competition – to want only that which the system can provide. Abandoning R and 
forgetting God, J plunges into the hell that is nothingness (increase in pure quantity, 
takathur, riba). By denying his need to love and be loved (the quest for union) he denies 
his being (J-R), mutilates his nature and rapes the earth. He is neither man nor beast but a 
demon unashamed. 
 
 Both Kant and Marx pretended that capitalist rationality would be superseded “in 
the end”. (But if there is no beginning, no metaphysical premises for the evaluation of 
need, how can there be an end ?). In the “Kingdom of Ends” and in communism the 
world will be a forum for expression. In that fantasy world J will be fully reconciled to 
his beinglessness – his separation from R. He will be reconciled to the Vedic teaching 
that “it is all right for anything to be anything for all is all play”. Life is just a flickering 
shadow on the wall of a cave, a shadow with myriad appearances which depicts the 
reality of illusion and makes it possible for us to dispense with seriousness and celebrate 
absurdity for ever and ever. 
 
 That this vision is unrealizable was foreseen by the ancient Greeks – Aristotle 
formulated this argument, at the most tedious length, in his doctrine of the eternity of the 
world. The collapse of the Communist regimes of East Europe shows that man is quite 
unwilling to abandon his faith in “purposefulness without purpose”. Socialism is not a 
process of transition to Communism – it is merely a detour – often a blind ally – along 
the capitalist road. This is because socialism provides no (metaphysical) basis for 
transcending the morality of avarice (accumulation) and jealousy (competition). 
Socialism, like Capitalism, seeks to reconcile J to his supposedly eternal separation from 
R. “Forget R and make the world your play thing” is the message of both liberal and 
socialist democracy. 
 
 But Javed can never forget R – he can never be reconciled to this separation for its 
only reason / causative is his sin. He must remember and lament and struggle and pray to 
end this separation for being with R is his only heaven. There can be no other. 
 
A Life of Love 
 
  Do you remember Rosalind ? Do you remember, when Jacques said “The worst 
fault you have is to be in love”, Orlando replied “It is a fault I will not change for your 
best virtue”. For it is this fault which makes possible the discarding of the “life of painted 
pomp”. 
 
What is it to be in love? As Silvis said 
“It is to be made of all sighs and sorrows. 
It is to be made of all faith and service. 
All adoration, duty and observance 
All humbleness, all patience … 
All purity, all trial …”. 
 
 
 To be in love is to participate in Rosalind’s existence by feeling for her. 
Psychology is a (failed) attempt to subject feelings to rational analysis. The psychologists 
regard feelings as a disturbing element which deflects thought from its rational norm. But 
feelings are an independent source for the validation of knowledge – the heart has its own 
reasons. Feelings are a way of appreciating the whole through participation in truth – a 
way not accessible to discursive thought for its appreciation of truth is always from the 
‘outside’, always as an ‘observer’, always partial. Discursive thought can never provide 
the insights that participationing reality can. 
 
 To the participant in truth, reality is not merely an external, observable 
phenomenon – emotions cannot be understood by behave moralists. I know my Rosalind 
better than I know the world for I participate in her existence. We share our inwardness. 
Rosalind has a body but for me she is much more than a body. Through feelings it is 
possible for us to transcend our bodies. Like physiology, psychology can tell me nothing 
about my Rosalind for psychology is not concerned with her self as a constituent of our 
being. Rosalind has a body but she is not just in it. She is also (and primordially) in my 
heart. By loving Rosalind I participate in constituting with her a shared subjectivity the 
essence of which is love. 
 
 Feelings are thus a way of directly participating in the world. Heidegger speaks of 
Gesthimmtheit – being attuned to the world. (The Sufis speak of ‘Haal’ in much the same 
way). We participate in the totality of our existence through feelings. Heidegger also 
describes feelings as Befindlichkeit – how one finds oneself. Feelings determine how one 
finds oneself in a given situation. How I find myself determines the insights I can 
develop. This is not insight as an observer but insight into a situation to which Javed 
belongs. The problem is to develop feelings which can allow J-R to develop a correct 
insight into their real, total situation. Feeling thus involves both intention (niyyat) and 
affection (ikhlas) – intention to become and belong to J-R and affection to that which is. 
 
 Without intention and affection insight into J-R’s real total situation cannot be 
achieved. Feelings characteristic of democratic societies are avarice (accumulation) and 
jealousy (competition). They disclose that J does not find himself ‘at home’ – by 
accumulation and competition he seeks to dominate R. If these are his feelings she can 
never belong to him for he can never belong to her and they can never belong to their real 
total situation. They are forever “not at home”. That is why democratic orders always 
attack and destroy the family for in these orders J and R are antecedently separated. They 
are always trying to get some place else. They can never be at home. 
 
 The fundamental (ontological) feeling of modern man is anxiety – Kierkegaard, 
Sartre, Heidegger are agreed on this.  
 
 Anxiety is revelatory of the human condition in democratic societies – that is why 
psychology and economics take the place of religion in democratic societies. Anxiety is 
the stock in trade of these disciplines and the justification and promotion of anxiety is 
their only project. 
 
 
 According to Kierkegaard, anxiety is prior to being, for J is anxious even in the 
state of innocence (there is therefore no being, no J-R, no heaven). J is anxious because 
he is conscious of his loneliness. Anxiety relates to no specific object but is a permanent 
feature, a defining characteristic of humanity. Anxiety creates an awareness of modern 
man’s total situation in the world. It reminds J that the is not and can never be at home. 
 
 According to Heidegger, “That in the face of which one has anxiety is being in the 
world as such - - -  that in the face of which anxiety is anxious is completely indefinite”. 
In democratic societies J “falls into inauthentic being with” R. He uses her as an 
instrument of his will – dominates her (jealousy). He is lost in “the busyness of his 
concern with the world of things” (accumulation). That which arouses anxiety is nothing 
(in democratic society this takes the form of the accumulation of capital) and is nowhere 
(for J-R is prior to J and R and being with R is J’s only heaven). Anxiety throws J back 
upon his self and spurs his quest for the freedom which is pure possibility. 
 
 But as Sartre saw the quest for freedom is absurd, for freedom creates anxiety 
both in the face of the future – which is nothing – and of the past – which I have lost. The 
exercise of freedom as a quest illustrates the impossibility of love – of being as J-R. 
Moreover, despite its presumed necessity, the quest for freedom is necessarily limited by 
death and by facticity. Nature always defeats freedom. To be human is to be bound. For J 
must die. Moreover, J does not choose to be the existent that he is. J just has to accept his 
particularly, his specifity, his historical situation. The past (being with R) is lost and the 
future is nothing. J’s origin and destination are unfathomable mysteries. J’s possibilities 
are thus necessarily tactical, limited. 
 
 J has been “thrown” into a particular existence – much as a gambler throws a 
dice. He may come up healthy or sick, rich or poor, intelligent or stupid. Reason cannot 
tell him why he has the capacities he has or why he is antecedently separated from his 
Rosalind. 
 
 If J is a consequence of “throwness” (the term is Heidegger’s) he can have no 
personal morality. He has the desires he has for no knowable reasons. He does not choose 
the desire he has. He is a receiver not a creator of objects. Because psychology accepts 
this ontology, its practitioners have no qualms in recommending sin, justifying lust and 
avarice and jealousy and self love. These are the personal attributes of the typical citizen 
of democratic society. Is it any wonder that such an individual finds himself perpetually 
‘not at home’ in his own body thus making psychology possible? 
 
 The limited freedom that facticity permits J is abruptly cut off by death. Man is 
aware of death in the democratic order not as a fulfillment of life but as a violent cutting 
off of existence. Death is the supreme possibility of existence. The liberal decocratic 
order seeks systematically to exclude all considerations of the problem of individual 
death as long as possible. It is incapable of evaluating the quality of feelings on the basis 
of the reality that is death and the after life. It pretends to imagine an artificial after life – 
Kant called it “the Kingdom of Ends”. Marx “the stage of communism” which 
legitimizes a validation of norms. But since this pretended after life is nothing – Kant’s 
categorical imperative and his kingdom of ends are pure form. Only an instrumentalist 
private morality can be endorsed in a democratic order. Such an order simply has no basis 
for the recognition of the worth of virtue. It is condemned to “forget being” and incapable 
of appreciating existence as a whole. Heidegger is profoundly mistaken in his belief that 
accepting death as an ultimate possibility enables J to avoid “falling”. For death cannot 
be accepted as qualifying all J’s possibilities unless J believes in the reality of the after 
life – the possibility of the restoration of being with R which is his only heaven. No such 
conception of the after life is possible in a democratic dispensation. 
 
 If death ends existence, there can be no knowledge of the whole. Existence is the 
transcendence of instants. There were instants when I experienced my Rosalind and these 
instants have fled. But by remembering “the slightest folly that ever love did make (me) 
run into”, I can realize the possibility of being with her all the time. 
 
 Rosalind is not just my past. She is my present and my future. By continuing to 
remember her I bring her into my present and by repentance and suffering and prayer I 
can will a future in which being with her (my only heaven) is restored. 
 
 I can combine in Rosalind my past, present and future – ‘Falling’ into the world is 
forgetting Rosalind. Attaining the eternal is combining my past, present, future in being 
with Rosalind. I must will this eternity, not just wish it. Willing (as against wishing) must 
take account of the real possibilities of the restoration of being with R. My future can 
never be of my making for my past had not been of my making either. I had done nothing 
to deserve Rosalind. Encounter with her was purely a gift from God. I proved unworthy 
of this gift. I lost her because of my selfishness, my inability to share with her my whole 
being. 
 
 I proved to be a man of bad faith. I lost my Rosalind because I sinned. I am guilty 
because I did not will being with R in the past. I am guilty because I do not will this 
being as I ought to will it in the present and am therefore fearful of losing being with R in 
the future. Being with R is my only heaven and losing it I cannot escape hell. 
 
 To will being with R, I must have hope, and hope is faith, and faith is faith in God 
– the only alternative is faith in the nothingness that is freedom. Guilt can be overcome 
by practicing the virtues that earn God’s forgiveness. The essence of virtue is ‘taqwa’, the 
integral awareness of my total dependence on God. Taqwa makes possible a 
manifestation of the love of God in all relations with all being. It makes it possible for me 
to see the divine in not just J-R but in all others. This requires ‘Sabr’ on the one hand and 
‘Ihsan’ on the other – virtues representing the twin aspects of Taqwa. Taqwa, Sabr and 
Ihsan constitute the morality of love and are an ethical refutation of avarice 
(accumulation) and jealousy (competition) which are manifestations of the morality of 
freedom. 
 
 The practice of the morality of love makes possible the restoration of my heaven 
– being with R. Through suffering and repentance and prayer I evoke God’s forgiveness 
and His grace. God loves me much, much more than I deserve to be loved. For has He 
not promised “I will run towards you when you walk towards me”? 
 
 Through suffering and repentance and prayer J explores the possibility of 
becoming what he really is, J-R. The uniqueness of my being is manifested in the reality 
that is not in an authenticity in which J seeks to mould himself in his own image by 
separating himself from R and from God. Kantian authentically is pure form. It requires J 
to invent his own values for he has been abandoned by God. Dosteyevsky said “since 
there is no God, everything is permitted”. He should have added “but nothing is 
possible”. Abandoning God necessarily implies J’s submission to nothing (freedom). 
Abandoning God must involve abandoning R – this is the meaning of the quest for 
freedom a freedom in which Javed plays at being God and becomes a demon. In this hell 
of his own making the crushes, smothers, devours his Rosalind to satiate his lust. For the 
seeker after freedom “Hell is other people” as Sartre put it. Being with R is being in hell 
if freedom not love is the basis of being. In this hell everything is as absurd and vicious 
and worthless as everything else. 
 
 Being with R must be based on love and love is being determined to action by the 
love of God. My master, Sheikh Abd-ul Qadir Jilani, has taught “know that God alone is 
your Friend for He alone loves you for your own sake”. The worth of virtue can only be 
determined on the basis of the will of God. Only on this basis can I will a particular form 
of being. The self cannot be the source of this type of validation – regarding the self to be 
such a validator is democracy’s primary error. 
 
 The self is merely the seat of desire. Self love is the love of desire. It takes the 
form of lust “(Shehwat)” or wrath “(Ghazab)” and manifests itself in the act of 
dominance. Freedom is a manifestation of self love. It takes the form of liberalism when 
the focus is on the satisfaction of lust (maximization of utility). It takes the form of 
nationalism and socialism when the quest if for power. In both manifestations the 
intensification of desires – not their transcendence – is the result. For when Javed loves 
his own desire, he makes of R an instrument and inflicting pain on her becomes a source 
of pleasure for him. Loving one’s own self is the ultimate perversion of being. 
 
 Heidegger recognizes the existence of an ‘upper’ or a ‘discriminating self’ (as 
does post Hegelian philosophy) but he also recognizes that “its discourse is silence”. In 
this perception there can be no universal morality for no individual conscience can speak 
with purity and it cannot therefore serve as a universal. 
 
 Only the explicit word of God can validate a claim, assign a value. The self can 
acquire the capacity of discrimination only by reference to the command of God “(Ruh)” 
and His Word “(Quran)”. This reference makes possible both self knowledge and 
transcendence from the lower to the discriminating self “(nafs-i-lawama)”. It makes 
possible a further transcendence – from discrimination to contentment, “(nafs-i-
mutmaina)” from existence to being. It makes it possible for Javed to appreciate existence 
as a gift from God for another existent – his Rosalind – was given to him as a pure gift. It 
shows him that he has the option of transcending the bounds of his existence and through 
suffering and repentance and prayer straining for being with R, (heaven). 
 
 
 Love is another word for knowing reality as it ought to be known. The need to 
know is inextricably intertwined with the need to be. Thus there is a personal factor 
involved in all knowing. This is particularly important in knowledge of our being – J-R – 
and knowledge of our situation (metaphysical knowledge). The moderns are increasingly 
reluctant to know J-R and Psychology is in this sense the ultimate perversion of 
epistemology for it regards reality to be a mere hallucination of J. His conception of 
merely reveals the delusions from which he suffers. The attempt to humanize the 
knowledge of God, reflects only the inability of its authors to develop any understanding 
of J’s destiny as J-R. Hence the necessary tragedy of modern thought. 
 
 The nature of this tragedy becomes evident when one examines the psychologist’s 
understanding of love. Thus Unamano speaks of “love when it struggles against destiny 
overwhelming us … and giving us a glimpse of a world in which destiny is overcome and 
liberty is law”. It is this conception of love which underlies Leary’s classification of 
inter-personal traits where dominance is contrasted with submission and hostility with 
love. 
 
 A moment’s reflection will show that his is not love at all. It is a perversion of 
love. If J seeks domination and R accepts submission there can be no J-R, ony J. In this 
perversion of being J plays at being God. By making R his slave, he “struggles against 
destiny” and seeks to make his “liberty law”. He falls a victim of self love which is a 
contradiction oin terms, for self love is lust pure and simple. If Javed loves his self, he 
can have no Rosalind for R is simply a means for the satisfaction of his lust or an object 
on which he vents his worth … she cannot be part of his being for he is incapable of 
being J-R or is it any wonder that wives experiencing and accepting such “love” exhibit 
masochistic tendencies and husbands articulating this type of “love” are sadists (as 
Kreitman, Hoeg and Revitck have repeatedly found). 
 
 Love cannot be of self for self must love being J-R. Self rejoices in its destiny 
(heaven J-R) and does not struggle against it. It is content for its primordial feeling is not 
anxiety but hope (and joy). Javed exults in and is overwhelmed by the beauty of his 
Rosalind. He is wonder struck by his miraculour encounter with her and extremely 
grateful to God for having given him such a precious, cherished, marvelous gift. Though 
I have lost my Rosalind, I hope of R a better world in which I shall desire more love and 
knowledge of her. I will this world by suffering and sacrifice and repentance and prayer. 
God wills it too for He loves me much more than I desire to be loved. I turn to my God in 
humility and contentment and proclaim with all my heart “Thy will be done”. And the  
angels say ‘Amen’. 
 
 Therefore, “my sweet Rose, my dear Rose be merry”. These our tears are tears of 
joy for our God has not abandoned us – He has shown us the way. Journey along this way 
requires the willing of being, of Reality. Reality is love (not freedom) and Love has two 
intertwined moments; the moment of the adoration of God “(Ibadat)” and the moment of 
the execution of His commands in this world “(khilafat)”. Living in these moments 
makes being possible and the attainment of being is entirely dependent on the will of God 
– it cannot be willed in defiance of His will … that is why the Sufi masters are 
unanimous in describing both the lover (J) and the beloved (R) as ‘Fuqara’ for as 
Sayyidna Isa said the kingdom of heaven (being with R) belongs to the poor who are 
blessed. To will ‘faqr’ you must reject the rich life. You must reject freedom. 
 
 These are my reasons – reasons of my heart and of my mind – by which I seek to 
persuade you to reject freedom, choose love, will reality. When you are sitting 
comfortably I’ll tell you how this can be done, but  
 
 
“Has’t any philosophy in thee Shepard ?” 
 
                
Note: 
 
 All unspecified quotations are from William Shakespeare play As you like it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
